In the event of a short-term, large-scale toxic chemical release to the atmosphere, shelterin-place (SIP) may be used as an emergency response to protect public health. We modeled hypothetical releases using realistic, empirical parameters to explore how key factors influence SIP effectiveness for single-family dwellings in a residential district. Four classes of factors were evaluated in this case-study: (a) time scales associated with release duration, SIP implementation delay, and SIP termination; (b) building air-exchange rates, including air infiltration and ventilation; (c) the degree of sorption of toxic chemicals to indoor surfaces; and (d) the shape of the dose-response relationship for acute adverse health effects. Houses with lower air leakage are more effective shelters, and thus variability in the air leakage of dwellings is associated with varying degrees of SIP protection in a community. Sorption on indoor surfaces improves SIP effectiveness by lowering the peak indoor concentrations and reducing the amount of contamination in the indoor air. Nonlinear dose-response relationships imply substantial reduction in adverse health effects from lowering the peak exposure concentration. However, if the scenario is unfavorable for sheltering (e.g. sheltering in leaky houses for protection against a nonsorbing chemical with a linear dose-response), the community must implement SIP without delay and exit from shelter when it first becomes safe to do so. Otherwise, the community can be subjected to even greater risk than if they did not take shelter indoors.
Introduction
In the event of a sudden, large-scale release of a toxic chemical into the atmosphere, nearby populations may be advised to take shelter indoors. Shelter-in-place (SIP) requires simply being indoors, closing doors and windows, and turning off fans. Broadly, SIP offers protection through two modes. First, lower peak indoor concentrations compared to outdoor concentrations are encountered after a short-term release because building envelopes limit indoor-outdoor air exchange. Second, sheltering may reduce cumulative exposures through one or more mechanisms, including transformations of toxic chemicals on building surfaces and timedependent manipulation of ventilation rates.
The effectiveness of SIP for protecting public health can depend upon many factors.
Attributes of the release, such as the quantity emitted, toxicity of the chemical, release duration, and atmospheric transport and dispersion, influence the effectiveness of protection. Building characteristics, including leakiness of the building envelope and the interactions between the toxic chemicals and building surfaces, also play an important role. Finally, human factors such as delays in notification and response, and the timing of shelter termination, can impact the effectiveness of the strategy.
Most prior studies of SIP effectiveness focused on characterizing single residences (Engelmann, 1992; Siren, 1993) . Existing software that assesses indoor concentrations during an atmospheric release event, such as ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres), assumes a typical air leakage value for all low-rise buildings (US EPA, 2006) . However, studies of air leakage reveal substantial variability among residential buildings (Chan et al., 2005) . This variability can lead to considerable differences in their ability to protect building occupants against outdoor releases. Vogt et al. (1999) speculate that residences constructed before 1970 may be more leaky then newer residences, owing to changes in building codes and construction practices. As a result, older dwellings may be less fit to function as emergency shelters. This dependency is supported by the detailed analysis presented in Chan et al. (2005) .
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As toxic chemicals penetrate building envelopes, some fraction might be lost to surfaces of the air leakage pathways, thus reducing the exposure of building occupants. However, only limited evidence is available to assess the significance of this mechanism (Karlsson, 1994; Liu and Nazaroff, 2001 ). Exposure during SIP may also be influenced by the interactions of toxic chemicals with indoor surfaces, including building materials and furnishings. Such interactions can occur through several mechanisms including redox reactions, acid-base reactions, hydrolysis, and sorption. Of these, the most thoroughly studied is sorption, which refers to the reversible or irreversible binding of a chemical to the surface, or within the bulk, of a material (Karlsson and Huber, 1996; Singer et al., 2005a) . Sorptive uptake can be fast relative to the air-exchange rate, thus it can effectively reduce the peak indoor concentration. The extent to which sorptive uptake occurs depends on properties of the toxic chemical in relation to the indoor materials. Because of differences in interior materials, variability in the rates of this process would be expected across a building stock.
SIP effectiveness is sensitive to time-scale parameters. If many residences have open
windows and doors at the time of the release, SIP effectiveness can be impaired owing to the time required to alert the community to close all windows and doors. Rogers (1994) compiled interview data on when decisions were made by key officials to warn the public following a release event. After the decision to warn is made, there can be another time delay before people comprehend the warning and take appropriate action. Community receipt and response times of different emergency warning systems have been investigated using post-event survey data (Rogers and Sorensen, 1989; 1991) . The time required for each step can vary considerably. The overall impact of delay in sheltering on SIP effectiveness also depends on the initial ventilation conditions of the dwellings.
The present paper is the second in a series that seeks to advance the understanding of community-scale SIP effectiveness and the factors that affect it. In the first paper , we conducted a parametric investigation using idealized representations of the system.
Two new metrics were introduced to quantify SIP effectiveness -the casualty reduction factor 4/31 (CRF) and the safety factor multiplier (SFM). SIP effectiveness was assessed using three coupled models to quantitatively link release conditions with adverse health consequences: a
Gaussian-plume dispersion model, an indoor-outdoor contaminant transport model, and a toxicload dose-response model. This analysis revealed that SIP effectiveness varies significantly with the toxic load exponent in the dose-response model and the time-scale parameters, namely the release duration and the building air-exchange rate.
The purpose of this second paper is to assess SIP effectiveness in a residential community using more realistic transport and transformation models and input parameters. The study is restricted to single-family detached housing units, which represent the majority of the US housing stock. Hypothetical releases with various characteristics are simulated using an operational atmospheric transport and dispersion model driven by real meteorological data.
Distributions of weather-driven air infiltration rates are predicted by incorporating variability in the air leakage among dwellings. Interactions of chemicals with indoor surfaces are modeled to capture the influence of sorptive interactions on SIP effectiveness. The effects of delays in initiating and terminating SIP are investigated. Because of the complexity of the simulations, this analysis encompasses only a limited sets of release conditions. However, the case studies are constructed such that many of the findings discussed here should apply to other residential communities taking shelter from large-scale outdoor releases.
Methods

Case Study
Three hypothetical releases of different duration (0.5, 1, and 2 h) are modeled for an urban residential district of a city that we will refer to as City A. Scenarios are chosen to represent large-scale toxic industrial chemical releases that pose significant health risks to downwind residences. The outdoor concentrations are simulated using an atmospheric dispersion model known as the Lagrangian Operation Dispersion Integrator (LODI), as operated by the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
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The model solves the 3-D advection-diffusion equation using a Lagrangian stochastic Monte Carlo approach (Ermak and Nasstrom, 2000) . LODI can simulate the effects on pollutant concentrations of mean wind advection, turbulent diffusion, buoyant plume rise, and pollutant dynamics such as first-order chemical reactions and wet and dry deposition. In the simulations presented here, pollutant dynamics are not included, meaning that the toxic chemical is treated as a conserved species in outdoor air. The toxicity of the released chemical is approximately equivalent to chlorine gas. The released mass of each simulation is scaled to produce the same number of potential casualties estimated for outdoor exposure. Releases on the order of 1 to 10 tonnes are thus simulated. In the event that people are exposed outdoors, severe acute adverse health effects are predicted to occur up to a distance of 5 to 7 km downwind from the release location. Adverse effects of exposure to the plume in the crosswind direction extend from 1 to 3 km from the plume centerline. Even though all simulations are scaled to produce the same number of potential outdoor casualties, locations where the casualties occur differ among the cases because of changes in wind direction as the event proceeds. In all cases, the outdoor concentrations were simulated for 4 h from the start of the release. At the end of the simulation the toxic plume had advected beyond the model domain, and the outdoor concentrations of the dispersed plume were no longer dangerous.
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Air Infiltration Rate Distribution
When doors and windows are closed, and fans are off, building air exchange occurs by uncontrolled air leakage across the building envelope, a phenomenon known as air infiltration.
The LBL infiltration model (Sherman and Grimsrud, 1980) predicts the rate of airflow, Q (m 3 s -1 ), through a building envelope driven by indoor-outdoor temperature difference, ∆T (K), and wind speed, U (m s -1 ), for a small detached building.
Here, f s (m s -1 K -0.5 ) and f w (-) are the stack-effect factor and the wind-effect factor, respectively, and ELA (m 2 ) is the effective leakage area of the building. The extent of shielding from nearby obstacles and local terrain affect the value of f w . For residential neighborhoods situated in an urban area, moderate shielding and urban terrain class are reasonable choices. Both f s and f w also depend weakly on the geometry and the distribution of leakage area over the building envelope.
Under the assumption that half of the total leakage area is attributable to the vertical walls of the building, and that there is little difference between the air leakage associated with the ceiling and Normalized leakage (NL) is ELA (expressed in units of cm 2 ) divided by the building floor area (m 2 ) and by a correction factor for building height. Air leakage measurements collected from houses across the US reveal that the NL of houses tends to increase with age, decrease with floor area, and to be higher for low-income than for not low-income households (Chan et al., 2005 The procedure to predict the air leakage distribution of houses in a census tract is briefly summarized here; see §3.4.2 in Chan (2006) for details. Houses in each census tract are first divided into 2 sets based on household income: above and below the poverty limit. Each set is further divided into groups according to house year-built and floor-area. The distribution of NL for each group of houses is predicted by its age, size, and household income status using a regression model derived from analysis of US nationwide air leakage measurements (Chan et al., 2005) . The number of houses in each group is extracted from data collected in the US Census The predicted air infiltration rates, defined as Q normalized by the house volume V (m 3 ), vary with time following a pattern similar to the change of wind speed during the simulation (Fig.   2 ). In this case study, the neighborhoods that are located closer to the release site have higher poverty rates and tend to have older and smaller dwellings. Consequently, the median air infiltration rates predicted there are about twice as high as in locations that are substantially downwind. Besides these spatial differences, Fig. 2 also shows the predicted variability at the two locations. Because air leakage of houses is roughly lognormally distributed (Chan et al., 2005) , leaky houses in the top 10 th percentile are predicted to have air infiltration rates reaching 8/31
1-2 h -1 . These tail-end estimates are much higher than the median value (0.6 h -1 ) predicted for houses in the model domain for this simulation.
Sorption on Indoor Surfaces
Sorptive uptake of toxic chemicals on indoor surfaces and desorption from indoor surfaces modify the time profile of indoor concentrations. The two-sink model of Singer et al. (2005a) captures the pollutant dynamics in a room by partitioning the chemical into three compartments: the room air, a surface sink, and an embedded sink. Chemicals in room air would first sorb onto the surface sink. Chemicals on the surface sink could then diffuse into the bulk material or through pores to hidden surfaces, which are collectively modeled as the embedded sink. Attachment to the surface and embedded sinks are each potentially reversible. The embedded sink interacts with the surface layer only, and not directly with the room air. In this model representation, the complex combination of materials that would be found in any real room is represented as a single effective material. Conservation of pollutant mass in the room air (C in ), on the surface sink (M) and in the embedded sink (E) yields three governing equations:
The mass in each compartment is normalized by the indoor volume, V, such that C in , M, and E are each expressed in units of g m -3 . The rate coefficients k a , k d , k 1 , and k 2 all have units of h -1 .
The present analysis considers both strongly sorbing and moderately sorbing compounds.
The rate coefficients used are shown in Table 1 . Parameters for dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP), a surrogate for nerve gas sarin, are used to represent chemicals that sorb strongly onto surfaces (Singer et al., 2005b) . Parameters for NH 3 are used to represent chemicals that sorb moderately (Karlsson and Huber, 1996) . A one-sink model is adequate to describe a moderately sorbing toxic chemical, where k 1 , k 2 , and E(t) are all set to zero.
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Shelter-in-Place Response Time
Implementing SIP in response to a release includes three steps, each associated with a time delay: (1) the time required for officials to issue a warning to the public, (2) the time required for the warning to substantially disperse throughout the population, and (3) the time required for people to effectively respond. These delays can vary considerably depending on the release circumstances. Values chosen for step (2) represent the time needed for 50% of the population to receive a warning given out by three methods: sirens plus telephones, sirens only, and media broadcast (Rogers and Sorensen, 1991) . Values chosen for step (3) are derived from survey data for an evacuation event, from which Rogers et al. (1990) Operation of exhaust or heating and cooling system fans can also increase air-exchange rates, but likely to a lesser extent than open windows . In the analysis presented here, where some residences have open windows. These cases represent a distillation of empirical evidence regarding air-exchange rates in residences (Wilson et al., 1996; Howard-Reed et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2004) ; however, issues such as between-dwelling variability and interaction of enhanced air-exchange with air infiltration are not considered. Table 3 summarizes the model parameters used in this paper to assess SIP effectiveness.
Shelter-in-Place Effectiveness Metrics
For each simulation, SIP effectiveness was quantified in terms of two metrics: the casualty reduction factor (CRF) and the safety-factor multiplier (SFM). In brief, CRF represents the fractional reduction in the expected number of casualties for populations sheltering indoors as compared with being exposed outdoors. The SFM is the multiplicative extent to which sheltering enhances the safety factor (SF) of an exposed individual. The safety factor can be interpreted as the maximum factor by which the exposure concentration could be multiplied without the exposed individual being subjected to potential adverse health effects. CRF and SFM are computed as follows (see Chan et al., 2006 for details):
CRF is defined at the community level, whereas SFM is evaluated at each grid cell. Both CRF and SFM can be evaluated as functions of time as the release proceeds. High values of CRF (upper limit = 1) and SFM (no upper limit) indicate effective SIP. In these equations, the toxic load limit, TLL [(mg m -3 ) m h], represents a threshold, above which an adverse health effect might result. The TLL used in this paper is comparable to that of acute exposure to chlorine leading to severe health effects (NRC, 2003) .
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Both CRF and SFM require computation of the toxic load (TL), which incorporates the potentially nonlinear dose-response effect of acute exposures to toxic chemicals (ten Berge et al.,
1986):
For an exposure event beginning at time t = 0, C(t) is the time-dependent breathing-zone concentration, and m is an empirical parameter referred to as toxic load exponent. The toxic load accumulated if one were exposed to the outdoor or indoor concentration are referred to as TL out or TL in , respectively. At each grid cell, TL in is computed using indoor concentrations evaluated at different percentiles of the air leakage distribution. Finally, we assume that the population density within any given census tract (obtained from US Census) is uniform when evaluating CRF and the distribution of SFM. Note that although we explore only three integer values of m (Table 3) , empirically determined values of m can be non-integers. Also, the results reported for a particular integer value of m would be similar to the results for toxic chemicals with values of m in the vicinity of the reported value.
Results and Discussion
Effects of Air Leakage Variability
Large variability in air leakage across the housing stock means that while tighter residences might provide sufficient protection for occupants, leakier residences may not. The result of this variability is illustrated in Fig. 3 . In this case, it is assumed that the chemical is conserved and nonsorbing, that people initiated SIP immediately upon chemical release, and that the dose-response relationship is linear (m = 1 in Eq. (5)). Adverse health effects are evaluated at the end of the 4-h simulation. All residents are assumed to remain indoors for the entire period. Fig. 3 shows that in areas within a few km downwind of the source, indoor toxic loads in most residences would exceed the toxic load limit, regardless of the leakiness of the building envelope.
On the other hand, in areas further downwind of the release, most people would be effectively 12/31 protected except those sheltering in leaky residences. The fraction of the population at risk of adverse health effects at each grid cell is determined by the condition TL in > TLL. We assume that the population in each grid cell is uniformly distributed among houses. As a result, the distribution of toxic loads for individuals matches that of indoor toxic loads. For example, if 10% of the houses have indoor toxic loads higher than the TLL, then we expect 10% of the population to be exposed to toxic loads exceeding the TLL.
Variability in air leakage among houses also explains differences in the calculated safetyfactor multiplier. The distribution of SFM is evaluated at each grid cell that encounters non-zero outdoor concentration using Eq. (4). Fig. 4 shows the aggregate distribution of SFM across grid cells for the same 1-h release scenario considered in Fig. 3 evaluated at the end of the simulation.
Houses that are classified as "tight", "typical", and "leaky" in Fig. 4 are those with air-leakage at the 5 th , 50 th , and 95 th percentiles of the distribution, respectively. For the conditions of this hypothetical release, Fig. 4 shows that the tightest houses can provide effective protection (SFM ~ 2-3), whereas the leakiest houses provide minimal protection (SFM ~ 1). Owing to this difference in the level of protection offered among houses, those who shelter in leaky houses can be at risk of adverse health effects even far downwind of the release. The overall SFM distribution for the entire exposed community is skewed (see "All Houses" in Fig. 4 ). While some residences provide values of SFM exceeding 2, most only reach values between 1.1 and 1.6
given the release scenario and SIP strategy considered in this case. Thus, one must account for air-leakage variability to accurately describe SIP effectiveness for a residential community. conserved pollutant, the eventual value of this integral is insensitive to the air-exchange rate so long as the rate does not change significantly with time. For chemicals with m > 1, casualty underpredictions from treating building air leakage as uniform at the median value can persist long after the release has ended.
Effects of Sorption and Response Time Delay
Sorption on indoor surfaces reduces peak indoor concentrations relative to the case of a nonsorbing chemical. For a 1-h release and for the sorption parameters considered here, the reduction in peak indoor concentration is in the range 15-65%. A slightly larger reduction is observed when the air infiltration rate of the house is lower. This is because fast exfiltration of the indoor air contaminant to the outdoors competes with sorption of chemicals onto surfaces, since both processes reduce indoor air concentrations. After the ambient plume has dispersed, reversibly sorbed chemicals slowly desorb from surfaces and reenter the room air. Compared to the case of nonsorbing chemicals, the indoor concentrations after the toxic plume has passed are less sensitive to the air-exchange rate when reversible sorption occurs. Similar low levels of residual chemicals are predicted in buildings with different air leakage. Strong sorption also causes the indoor concentration in leaky buildings to be consistently higher compared to buildings with lower air infiltration rate. This outcome differs from the case of nonsorbing chemicals, where the indoor concentrations in the leakiest buildings will decline the fastest after the outdoor plume has passed. The difference occurs because strong sorption causes a large amount of the toxic chemical to accumulate on surfaces in leaky buildings. Desorption then can mostly compensate for loss by exfiltration, keeping the indoor concentration high for a long time after the toxic plume has passed. As a result, the indoor concentrations are sustained at a slightly higher level relative to buildings with lower air infiltration rates.
As illustrated in Fig. 6 , SIP is more effective for sorbing chemicals than for nonsorbing chemicals, and also more effective for chemicals that exhibit strong sorption than for moderately sorbing species. The upper frames show that the casualty reduction factors exceed 0.75 for 14/31 sorbing chemicals in all the scenarios modeled. The lower frames illustrate the interaction between the toxic load exponent (m) and the strength of sorption in influencing the safety factor multiplier. A key to SIP effectiveness, especially when the toxic load exponent is high, is to reduce the peak exposure concentrations. In response to ambient plumes of short duration (i.e., release duration shorter than the inverse of the building air-exchange rate), both slow airinfiltration and reversible sorption act to reduce peak indoor concentrations. Comparing like conditions in Fig. 6 , the median SFM is increased by a factor of 2-3 for m = 3 compared with m = 1. For m = 3, the interquartile range of air-exchange rates influences SFM by a factor of 2-3 also. Finally, the difference between strong sorption and no sorption causes another factor of 2-3 difference in SFM. The overall result is that the safety factor multiplier spans well more than an order of magnitude for the range of scenarios displayed in If SIP is not implemented until after a release has already begun, toxic chemicals that entered the building at high concentration during a period of elevated air-exchange rate can be trapped indoors because people shut their windows or stop operating fans that had induced the additional air exchange above infiltration. The importance of prompt SIP initiation depends on a number of factors. The longer the release duration, the longer the toxic load is accumulated. As a result, the penalty of having an initial period of fast air exchange with the outdoors becomes less significant to the overall exposure for releases of long duration. Proximity of the exposed population to the release location also matters. At locations close to the release site, the outdoor concentrations rise rapidly and reach a peak value soon after the release begins. 
Is Shelter-in-Place Always Beneficial?
There are some conditions under which SIP could be ineffective. Yet, three aspects of SIP help counteract the risk of doing more harm than good. First is the effect of nonlinear doseresponse (m > 1). The middle and right-hand columns of Fig. 7 show that when m = 2 or 3, SIP initiation time delay has little effect on the casualty estimates. The second factor is termination 16/31 time. Prompt termination can mitigate the impact of a delayed start. Terminating SIP soon after it is safe to do so substantially eliminates the loss in effectiveness caused by a delay in initiation time. By terminating SIP promptly, people would no longer be exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals trapped indoors. Consequently, even for the case m = 1 (Fig. 7, left frames) , elevated amounts of chemicals entering indoors owing to late SIP initiation would not cause as much adverse health effects to the occupants if prompt termination can be achieved.
Sorption to indoor surfaces is the third factor that can potentially offset the loss in effectiveness caused by an initiation time delay. Fig. 8 shows the predicted potential casualties if people were to take shelter 1 h after the start of a hypothetical release for three sorption cases:
none, moderate and strong. For these cases, adverse health effects are evaluated for m = 1 only, where SIP effectiveness is the most sensitive to the parameters considered. Before SIP is initiated, it is assumed that 40% of the residences have increased air-exchange (1 h -1 above infiltration) from open windows. For all release durations considered, sorption on indoor surfaces at a moderate rate is sufficient to sustain SIP effectiveness. Even in the worst-case scenario where SIP was not implemented until after the release has already stopped (i.e. a 0.5-h release duration with a 1-h SIP initiation time delay), as long as the toxic chemical is at least moderately sorbing, SIP would not cause more harm to the community relative to outdoor exposure (i.e.
CRF > 0). The predicted SFM values also exceed 1 at all grid cells for these conditions, meaning that no one is expected to accumulate toxic load higher than the corresponding outdoor level even if they did not close their windows until an hour after the release has started. On the other hand, if the toxic chemical is nonsorbing indoors, about 50% of the affected population can be worse off than if they were exposed to the outdoor levels (i.e. TL in > TL out ). For the community as a whole, however, some benefit from sheltering can still be realized, especially among parts of the neighborhood that are further downwind of the release site but are still within the area of impact. Residents sheltering in tighter buildings are also better protected. Factors such as the proximity of the population to the release location, and the speed of the advecting plume, also 17/31 affect how sensitive SIP effectiveness is with respect to the response time delay of the community.
Conclusion
In planning for emergency situations, model predictions can provide officials with expectations about the effectiveness of a response strategy. The analysis presented here explored several factors that can affect SIP effectiveness. Some of these factors are controllable, such as the response time of the community to take shelter; others are inherent of the situation, such as the release conditions and the chemical properties. We estimated the influence of these factors on SIP performance using a case-study approach. Distributions of air infiltration rates were modeled using housing characteristics from an urban residential area and local meteorology. The consequent variability in indoor concentrations was modeled both temporally and spatially for releases of different durations and with different dose-response relationships. Adverse health effects are estimated for the exposed community by taking this variability into account. Houses that are older, smaller, and occupied by low-income households tend to have higher air leakage, and as a result they provide less effective shelter. As part of a community preparedness effort, attention should be paid to these vulnerable dwellings, especially those located close to a potential release sources.
The influence of sorption of toxic chemicals to indoor surfaces and of time delays associated with implementing the SIP strategy was evaluated using two measures of effectiveness: casualty reduction factor (CRF) and safety-factor multiplier (SFM). Even for chemicals that sorb only moderately to indoor surfaces, sorption is sufficient to offset the need for timely termination of SIP, and to counteract the loss in effectiveness caused by SIP initiation
delay. Yet, in certain scenarios, improving the response time of the community when instructed to take shelter can be key to a successful strategy against adverse health effects from exposure to a toxic outdoor release. For example, if the released chemical is nonsorptive and its doseresponse is linear, emergency responders and authorities must (1) ensure that people take shelter 18/31 quickly, and (2) give all-clear signal as soon as it is safe. Otherwise, the community can run the risk of being worse off with SIP than without it.
The case study presented here considers a limited set of scenarios typical of a large-scale release in a moderately dense urban neighborhood. In situations where the parameters deviate far from those modeled in this analysis, SIP effectiveness might differ. The level of protection considered here is easily achievable under current conditions in typical residences. Proactive measures, such as using stand-alone air cleaners (Ward et al., 2005) or duct tape and plastic sheets (Jetter and Whitfield, 2005) , might improve effectiveness. However, they can be costly and time consuming to deploy, which might limit their utility for community-scale application.
Furthermore, this analysis is restricted to single-family detached dwellings. Other forms of residences, such as townhouses and apartment buildings, and other buildings, such as offices and schools, can have air leakage characteristics that are significantly different (Price et al., 2006; Sherman and Chan, 2006) . The airflow in these buildings also tends to be more complex owing to their larger sizes and the flow resistance of internal partitions. These types of buildings constitute a large fraction of the building stock, especially in urban areas. A large proportion of a potentially exposed population might be at schools, workplaces, and commercial establishments rather than in their homes at the time of a release. For these reasons, knowing the characteristics of these buildings is also essential to evaluating SIP effectiveness for an exposed community.
We intend to address these issues in a future article on SIP effectiveness in commercial buildings.
There are other aspects of this analysis that warrant more detailed consideration in the future. Some chemicals can have other important reactions or removal pathways indoors that are not considered in this analysis. Variability in human susceptibility in response to acute exposure to toxic industrial chemicals and chemical warfare agents (Griffiths and Megson, 1984; Sommerville, 2003) might substantially influence casualty estimates and predicted areas at risk of adverse health effects. Stochastic fluctuation in the outdoor concentrations not captured by the atmospheric dispersion model implies that SIP is likely to be more protective than the results presented in this analysis (Hilderman et al., 1999; Yee, 1999) . The present analysis also assumed 19/31 that the entire community was already indoors at the time of the release and all would follow the instruction to shelter-in-place without exception. The validity of these two assumptions might vary depending on the time or day of the release, and the degree of emergency preparedness of the community. In situations where short initiation time delays are important, the distribution of response time in a community and the rate of non-compliance should be modeled explicitly. at the tightest and leakiest 5 th percentiles ("tight" and "leaky"), and in houses at the median of the air-leakage distribution ("typical"), for the entire 4-h simulation. SFM values are evaluated at each grid cell, and the distributions are weighted by the number of exposed individuals. The rightmost boxplot incorporates the variability in air-leakage of houses and gives the expected distribution for the entire exposed community. Simulation conditions are the same as in Fig. 3 . Singer et al. (2005b) . b Represented by ammonia (NH 3 ), using empirical data from Karlsson and Huber (1996) . c A surface-to-volume ratio of 3.5 m 2 m -3 (Singer et al., 2005b ) is assumed when converting the uptake rate coefficient from 1.1 × 10 -4 m s -1 , as it is originally reported, to units of inverse time (h -1 ). Rogers and Sorensen (1991) . c Source: Rogers and Sorensen (1989) ; Rogers et al. (1990) . 
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